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The Parts of Definitions, Unity, and 
Sameness in Aristotle's Metaphysics
Mark R. Wheeler
First principles (ά ρ χ ά ι)  are crucial to Aristotle's 
conception of scientific knowledge (επ ισ τή μ η ). In the 
Posterior Analytics, Aristotle teaches us that all scientific 
knowledge is either knowledge arrived at through 
demonstration from first principles or knowledge of the 
first principles themselves. The first principles of a given 
science are the primary premises (τ oc π ρ ώ τ a )  of that science 
(Pst. An., 72a7); they express the essential characteristics 
of the substance about which the given science is 
concerned; and all other scientific knowledge is derived 
from the first principles through syllogistic inference.1
The first principles of the various sciences are 
expressed through definition (ο ρ ισ μ ό ς). More precisely, 
the first principle of a science is a definition which provides 
an indemonstrable account of the essence (λόγος του τ ί
'On the importance of first principles and demonstration 
for Aristotle's philosophy of science, see Michael 
Ferejohn’s The Origins o f Aristotelian Science (New Haven; 
Yale, 1991) and Richard McKirahan's Principles and 
Proofs: Aristotle's Theory o f Demonstrative Science 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1992), especially 
chs. 2, 12, and 13.
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έ σ τ ιν  α να π ό δεικ το ς) of the subject matter of the science.2 
Throughout the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle assumes that 
such definitions (usually termed "real definitions") are not 
only possible but actual, provides explanations for how we 
come to possess these definitions, and outlines methods for 
stating them clearly. Examples of first principles include 
the definition of "man" as "two-footed animal" and the 
definition of "arithmetical unit" as "indivisible quantity."
At least two conclusions follow from these considera­
tions concerning first principles. First, unless we are in 
possession of the first principles of some science, we can 
have no scientific knowledge. Second, since we possess a 
first principle only if we possess a definition, any problem 
which threatens to undermine Aristotle’s theory of 
definition is a threat to the project of Aristotelian science. 
In this paper, I investigate a problem for Aristotle's theory 
of definition of which Aristotle was fully aware, and I 
argue for an interpretation of Aristotle's solution to that 
problem which helps, in part, to explain the connections 
among Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota of the 
Metaphysics.
2In Book II chapter 10 of the Posterior Analytics, 
Aristotle distinguishes among three different kinds of 
definition: (1) definitions which express the meaning of a 
term without asserting that there is anything in the world 
corresponding to the definition, (2) definitions which 
explain through quasi-demonstration why a thing which 
exists in the world exists, and (3) definitions which provide 
indemonstrable accounts of essences, as apprehended 
through intuition (νους). It is the latter of these three kinds 
that are of importance here.
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That Aristotle’s analysis of sensible substance in Book 
Zeta gives rise to difficulties in connection with his theory 
of definition is well known.3 Aristotle's attempt to 
reconcile his analysis of sensible substance (ο ύ σ ία ) with his 
theory of definition as presented in his other works, 
particularly the Posterior Analytics, leads him to reconsider 
his account of definitions which express indemonstrable 
essences and to consider whether or not, and in what sense, 
definitions must include accounts o f the parts of the 
.substances being defined.
Initially, at least, the prospect of a successful 
reconciliation looks good. The concept of sensible 
substance is analyzed, and four candidates for primary 
substance are acknowledged (Met., 1028b35): the essence 
(το τ ί  ήν ε ίνα ι), the universal (το καθόλου), the genus (το 
γ ένο ς), and the subject (τό υποκείμενον). The latter of 
these is then singled out as being in the truest sense 
substance, and Aristotle turns to investigation of the 
concept of subject. The concept of a subject is analyzed 
into its three separate senses (Met., 1029a3): (1) the matter 
(ή ύλη ), (2) the form (ή μορφή =  το  ε ίδ ο ς ) , and (3) the 
composite of matter and form (το έκ τούτω ν [τής ύλης καί 
του είδους]); the form is identified with the essence; and 
the claim that the definition is an account of the essence of 
some substance is reaffirmed (Met., 1030a8). All of this
3See Michael Ferejohn's forthcoming "Matter, 
Definition, and Generation in Aristotle's Metaphysics" and 
his forthcoming "The Definition of Generated Composites 
in Aristotle’s Metaphysics," also Michael Frede's "The 
Definition of Sensible Substances in Metaphysics Z" in D. 
Devereux and P. Pellegrin, edd., Biologie, Logique, et 
Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris 1990), pp. 113-144.
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bodes well for the unity of the Aristotelian project of 
explaining scientific knowledge.
Not surprisingly, difficulties soon threaten. Beginning 
at Zeta 10, Aristotle raises the following compound 
question (Met., 1034b20): Since all definitions are formulae 
and all formulae have parts, what are the parts of the 
definition and how are the parts of the definitions related to 
the whole? Aristotle answers the first part of this question 
handily by way of the following conclusions (see, for 
Aristotle's summary of these points, Met., 1037a21): All 
definitions of sensible substances are formulae of essences 
which are composed of parts; the only terms included in a 
definition of sensible substance are terms which refer to 
parts of the essence of the sensible substance (Met., 
1035b34); and no terms which refer to the material parts of 
sensible substance are included in the definition of sensible 
substance (Met., 1036a9). The remaining part of the 
question, however, is not so easily answered.
The question of how the parts of a definition are related 
to the whole so as to form a unity is an outstanding 
question for Aristotle's theory of definition as presented in 
the Posterior Analytics (cf. Pst. An., 93b35). To get at the 
fundamental problem as Aristotle understood it, I turn now 
to a reconstruction of a reductio ad absurdum  Aristotle 
constructs on the basis of it. Considerable attention has 
been paid to book Zeta chapter 13 of the Metaphysics with 
regard to Aristotle's theory of primary substances,4 less
4See Alan Code's "No Universal is a Substance: An 
Interpretation of Metaphysics Z13, 1038b8-15" in Paidea 
(1978), Special Aristotle Issue, pp. 65-74, and Michael 
Woods' "Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13" in 
Aristotle: A Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. Julius
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attention has been given to how Zeta 13 bears on Aris­
totle's theory of definition. Given the close ties which bind 
Aristotle's theory of definition to his theory o f primary 
substances, one might think that this is because Zeta 13 has 
no bearing on Aristotle’s theory of definition. But, at the 
end of Zeta 13, Aristotle presents the following reductio ad 
absurdum:
If no substance can consist of universals, because 
they mean "of such a kind," and not a particular 
thing; and if no substance can actually be composed 
[σ ύνθετον] of substances, every substance will be 
incomposite [άσύνθετον], and so there will be no 
formula [λόγος] of any substance. But in point of 
fact it is universally held, and has been previously 
stated, that substance is the only or chief subject of 
definition [ o  pov]; but on this showing there is no 
definition [ορισμό ς] even of substance. Then there 
can be no definition of anything; or rather in a 
sense there can, and in a sense there cannot. What 
this means will be clearer from what follows later. 
(Met., 1039al4-23; trans. Tredennick)
Moravcsik, (New York, 1967), pp. 215-238, for discus­
sions on these points. The discussion in the secondary 
literature focuses on Aristotle's claims concerning the 
universality of substance. My arguments here assume that 
Aristotle is committed to the claim that primary substance 
is a universal of some sort, viz., that the ínfima species 
which is predicated of the matter is universal in some sense 
of κ α θ ό λο υ . I leave to one side whether or not Aristotle is 
inconsistent in his full account of substance.
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The first feature of this passage worth noting is Aristotle's 
recognition that some of his assumptions concerning sub­
stance in the Metaphysics seem to entail that there can be 
no definition of substance. But this is of course absurd, 
since on all accounts "substance is the only or chief subject 
of definition." The second feature of note is that Aristotle 
immediately reassures the reader that all is not lost: At 
least in one sense of what he means by "definition," there 
can be a definition of substance, and Aristotle promises to 
make clear what he means by this in the sequel. Thus, 
there are two ways in which Zeta 13 appears to play a 
crucial role in our understanding the difficulties confronting 
Aristotle's theory of definition in the Metaphysics: First, 
he presents in a concise fashion the problem as he sees it; 
second, he informs us that the solution to the problem is to 
be solved in some part of the Metaphysics following Zeta 
13.
Turning now to the problem as Aristotle presents it, I 
assume for the moment that none o f the terms in the 
passage from Zeta 13 are ambiguous. Appealing to parts 
of the Metaphysics and of the Posterior Analytics already 
discussed above for Aristotle's implicit assumptions, a 
preliminary reconstruction reveals that the following 
premises entail the claim that there can be no definition of 
substance:
A) All substances are incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ετα ) .
B) All definitions are composite (σ ύ ν τ ε τ α ) .5
5See, e.g., Met., 1034b20 & 1042a20.
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C) All definitions have the same structure (είδος)6 as 
that of which they are definitions.7
Premise A follows from the following premises 1-3, each 
of which Aristotle accepts:
(I) No substance can consist o f universals. Here I read 
"consist of” as meaning "composed of" in the sense of "has 
for parts." Reading "consists of" in this way, the following 
reasoning justifies premise 1. Aristotle is at least 
committed to the claim that not all universals are substance. 
We know this because qualities and quantities (which are 
universals) cannot be ontologically prior to substances, and 
the higher genera (also universals) are ontologically 
posterior to and dependent upon the species. Thus,
6The crucial passage giving rise to this interpretation of 
the relation between the parts of formulae and the parts of 
things is the following:
Έπει δέ ό ορισμός λόγος έστί, τα  δέ λόγος μέρη . 
έχει, ώς δέ ό λόγος προς το πράγμα, και τδ μέρος 
του λόγου προς το μέρος του πράγματος ομοίως έχει, 
άπορειται ήδη πότερον δει τον των μερών λόγον 
ένυπάρχειν έν τφ  του όλου λόγω ή ου. (1(Β4ΰ20-24) 
One way of understanding Aristotle’s use of ε ίδος is 
"structure." Since the discussion here concerns essences 
and essences are, for Aristotle, identified with the species 
form (which is another use of "ε ίδ ο ς" ), I have chosen to 
render "είδος" as "structure" in connection with the 
question of how the parts of λ ό γ ο ι are related to the whole 
in the same way that the parts of the thing are related to the 
whole.
7See, e.g.. Met., 1034b21.
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substance cannot have as parts these kinds of universals 
because they cannot exist independently of substance.
Further, if anything is a substance and is universal in 
nature, it is the ínfima species. Let us suppose, as is 
reasonable, that primary substance is to be identified with 
the ínfima species. The ínfima species are universals of 
some sort, so substance might consist of this kind of 
substance. But by Zeta 13 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle has 
ruled out any candidate for substance other than the matter, 
the ínfima species, and the composite of these. Thus, 
insofar as substance can consist of universals, either the 
matter must consist of universals, which is false since 
matter is indeterminate, or the ínfima species must, which 
is false since these are indivisible, or the concrete 
individual must, which again is false because the concrete 
individual is separable into matter and Ínfima species only 
in theory not in the strong sense required. Thus, substance 
is not composed of universals in the sense of Ínfima species 
either.
Since qualities (of various categories), quantities and 
substances exhaust Aristotle's ontology, no substance 
consists of universals.
(2) No substance can be composed o f other substances. 
Again, "composed of" here is to be understood in the sense 
of having parts which can exist independently. If substance 
=  essence, we know the Ínfima species is indivisible. A 
fortiori, we know that it cannot be composed of others of 
its ilk. If substance = matter, it is clear that matter is not 
composed of substances for Aristotle. If substance =  
concrete individual, the concrete individual insofar as it is 
a substance is not composed of parts which can exist 
independently.
(3) I f  no substance can be composed o f other substances 
and no substance can consist o f universals, then every
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substance is incomposite. Either something is a substance 
or a universal. If substances are not composed of either 
substances or universals, then they are not composed of 
anything. If substances are not composed of anything, then 
they are incomposite.
A) Every substance is incomposite.
(ffl) No substance is composite.
Premise B «fe C and an additional assumption, each of 
which Aristotle accepts, entail the following conclusion #2:
(a) AH formulae are composite. [Met., 1034b20, 1042a20]
(b) Nothing composite has the same structure as something 
incomposite.
(c) All formulae have the same structure as the things o f 
which they are formulae, [e.g., Met., 1034b21]
(d) All definitions are formulae.
(#2) All definitions are definitions of composite things.
Aristotle remains committed to some version of all three 
of these assumptions throughout the Metaphysics, but he 
also believes he can consistently maintain that there are 
definitions of substance. Aristotle avoids this apparent 
inconsistency by showing that each of the premises À-C 
contains an ambiguous term. Aristotle's solution depends 
upon recognizing the ambiguity of four terms contained in
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premises A-C: "substance," "composite," "same," and 
"definition." By Zeta 13, Aristotle has narrowed the 
problem down to disambiguating the various senses of the 
term "definition," and it is a distinction in the senses of 
"definition" which Aristotle introduces in subsequent parts 
of the Metaphysics in order to solve his problem. Before 
presenting my interpretation of how Aristotle resolves the 
problem, I will clarify the meanings of the important terms 
contained in the premises.
Aristotle's claims concerning definitions in the passage 
from Zeta 13 are to be understood in the sense we have 
been working with all along, viz., an indemonstrable 
account of the essence. Prior to this point in Zeta, 
Aristotle has distinguished among a number of different 
candidates for definitions and has narrowed the field 
considerably. Definitions of the concrete particular and 
definitions of the matter, as well as definitions of qualities, 
quantities and accidental compounds, have been dismissed 
by Aristotle before Zeta 13 as being only of secondary 
import. (For Aristotle's explicit rejections of the former 
kinds of definitions see Met. 1036a and 1037a26 
respectively, for the latter kinds see Met., 1030al2.).8
8Among the possible kinds of definitions of substance, 
Aristotle countenances three, each of which corresponds to 
a kind of substance investigated in the Metaphysics: (1) 
definition of the matter, (2) definition of the essence, and 
(3) definition of the concrete individual which is the 
combination of matter and essence. Aristotle cannot allow 
for definitions of matter if "matter" is understood in the 
way Aristotle explicates it prior to Zeta 13 as that which is 
"neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor designated by 
any of the categories which define Being" (Met., 1029a20).
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When he uses the term "substance" in Zeta 13, Aristotle 
is talking about either the matter, the concrete particular or 
the essence. Aristotle is clearly concerned with sensible 
substance in the middle books of the Metaphysics. Given
One simply cannot define that which falls under none of the 
categories which define Being. Later, in Book Eta, 
Aristotle again talks of definitions of matter, but his 
discussion there concerns the definitions proposed by other 
philosophers and does not bear on his conclusions in Zeta.
Aristotle does not allow for definitions of concrete 
individuals. Aristotle does not demonstrate in full the 
impossibility of definitions of concrete individuals until 
Zeta 15, and this fact has lead at least one commentator, 
Tredennick, to conclude that this sense of definition was 
still in the running at Zeta 13. Two things make this 
reading untenable. First, Aristotle had already discounted 
this kind of definition of substance prior to Zeta 13 and had 
presented his reasons for doing so (see Zeta 11 and 12, 
especially 1036a5). Furthermore, Zeta 15 is part of a 
polemic against the Platonist conception of substantial 
Forms understood as concrete individuals which Aristotle 
began at Zeta 14; as such, the rehearsing of the arguments j 
for the impossibility of definitions of concrete particulars in 
Zeta 15 is best understood as supporting Aristotle's attack 
on the Platonist position.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that by Zeta j 
13 Aristotle has ruled out every kind of definition except 
for definitions of the essence. This contention is 
strengthened by the fact that Aristotle has asserted, in many 
places prior to Zeta 13 that real definitions are the primary 
and unqualified kind of definition of substance (see, e.g .. 
Met., 1030b5).
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that Aristotle has concluded that there can be in no sense 
definitions of the matter or of the concrete particular and 
given that Aristotle has argued, prior to Zeta 13, that the 
essence is substance in the primary sense of the term, it 
seems clear Aristotle is referring to the essence of sensible 
substance when he puzzles over the connection between 
definitions and substance in Zeta 13.
In virtue of what has been said, we can restate the three 
assumptions listed above:
A') All essences (τ cc τ ί ή v ε ίv a  i) of sensible substances 
are incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ε τα ) .
B') All definitions are composite (σ ύ νθ ετα ).
C )  All definitions have the same structure (ε ίδος) as 
the essences (τα  τ ί  ή ν  ε ί ν α ι )  of which they are 
definitions.
We can likewise reconstrue Aristotle's proposed solution to 
the problem in the following way: In one sense of "defi­
nition," there can be no definition o f the essence of sensible 
substances; in another sense, there can be definitions of the 
essence of sensible substances.
Having clarified the relevant senses of "substance" and 
of "definition" in the above premises, I will now focus on 
some other problematic terms in the premises. Premise A’ 
contains the terms "essence" (το  τ ί  ή ν  ε ίν α ι)  and 
"incomposite" (ά σύνθετα). While not pretending to provide 
a detailed analysis of Aristotelian essences, I can make 
some remarks sufficient for my purposes here. In the 
Metaphysics, essences of sensible substances are the 
primary substances of the sensible world; that is to say, 
they are the ontologically fundamental constituents of the
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Aristotelian sensible universe. Each essence of a sensible, 
substance is its form (e.g., the essence of man is the form 
that all men exhibit, which form is an Ínfima species o f the 
genus animal), certain groups of essences are grouped 
together into classes called "genera" (e.g., the ¿ssence of 
man, the essence of dog and the essence of cat can be 
grouped together under the genus "animal"), and essences 
are types of which there must be tokens (e.g., Aristotle was 
a token of the type man). This last claim, which is 
somewhat controversial, is particularly important for my 
discussion here. In claiming that essences of sensible 
substances must have tokens, I am assuming that the 
essences of sensible substances cannot exist separately from 
the concrete individuals of which they are the essences. 
There cannot be an essence of man unless there is at least 
one concrete particular which is a combination of the 
essence of man and the matter appropriate to man. This 
assumption is well supported by what Aristotle asserts in 
chapter Zeta; for example,
Is there then some sphere besides the particular 
spheres, or some house besides the bricks? Surely 
no individual thing would ever have been generated 
if form had existed thus independently. (Met., 
1033b21; trans. Tredennick)
A consequence of this view is that the essences of sensible 
substances cannot exist separately from matter.
Aristotle asserts that the essences of sensible substances 
áre incomposite (ά σ ύνθετα ). Plato used ά συν θ ε τά  in the 
Phaedo (78c) in connection with composite objects and 
natural compounds, and the thrust of the discussion there is 
to distinguish things which can be broken up into parts, and 
things such as the soul which cannot be so dispersed.
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Likewise in the Theaetetus, Plato refers to the primary 
elements of which other things are composed as 
incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ετα ). Aristotle adopts Plato's use of 
ά σ ύ ν θ ετα  in connection with part-whole relations.
Aristotle discusses various part-whole (μ έ ρ ο ς -ό λ ο ς )  
relations in Book Delta, chapter 25, of the Metaphysics A  
but it will suffice here to consider two of these. The first 
kind of part-whole relation obtains between things (τά δ ε  
τ ι)  which are divisible into parts which are themselves 
individual things (τ ό δ ε  τ ι) . The second kind of part-whole 
relation obtains between a form (το ε ίδο ς) and its 
constituent parts (parts which are not themselves individual 
things (άνευ  του ποσού). In what follows, I refer to the first 
kind of part-whole relation as the aggregate conception, and 
the second as the essential conception.
Premise B' concerns definitions and asserts that all 
definitions have parts. This is a corollary of Aristotle's 
claim, made in various places, that all formulae have parts, 
(see, e .g .. Met., 1034b20, 1042a20) It is sufficient in this 
context to state that the parts of formulae and, hence, of 
definitions are nouns (see De Int.). Aristotle uses λ ό γ ο ς  to 
refer variously to either linguistic entities (usually termed 
"accounts"), conceptual entities, or essences themselves. 
While disentangling these different uses of λό γο ς may be 
important for other reasons, I do not believe that these 
considerations have any bearing on the arguments devel­
oped here. For ease in exposition, I will render λ ό γ ο ς  in 
the sense of a linguistic account in what follows.
All definitions are formulae of essences. Aristotle states 
that the formula of the essence is the formula composed of 
the ultimate differentia and its primary genus (see, e.g ., 
Met., 1038a5, 1038al9 and 1038a25). The ultimate 
differentia (e.g., rational) and the primary genus (e.g., 
animal) constitute the parts of the definition (e.g., of man).
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Thus, definitions satisfy Aristotle's requirement that all 
formulae have parts, and we can restate premise B' to read 
"All definitions are composed of the ultimate differentia and 
its primary genus."
Premise C is derived from the following passage 
concerning definitions and formulae:
Since a definition is a formula, and every formula 
has parts; and since the formula is related to the 
thing in the same way as the part of the formula to 
the part of the thing, the question now arises; Must 
the formula of the parts be contained in the formula 
of the whole, or not? (Met., 1034b20-24; trans. 
Tredennick)
While this passage explains in full neither how formulae are 
related to the things of which they are formulae nor how 
the parts of formulae are related to the parts of things to 
which they refer, Aristotle does present here a 
compositional account of the relation whereby insofar as 
formulae are related to things so too the parts of formulae 
are related to the parts of things. Using Aristotle's 
example at Met., 1043al3ff., in the formula for a house 
there will be a part referring to the matter of a house 
(stones, bricks, and wood) and a part referring to the 
essence of a house (a receptacle for retaining goods and 
bodies). From this we can plausibly conclude that, insofar 
as a formula taken as a whole is related to something, the 
parts of the formula must likewise be related to the parts of 
the thing. Since this constraint concerns the relation of 
parts of formulae with parts of things, it can be construed 
as a relation between the structures of formulae and the 
structures of things.
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Turning now to discuss Aristotle's concept of 
"sameness" as explicated in the Metaphysics, anything 
which is the same as something else is in some sense one 
with that other thing. Aristotle distinguishes among four 
different kinds of oneness: numerical oneness, formal 
oneness, generic oneness, and analogical oneness (Met., 
1016b30ff.). Two things are numerically one just in case 
they cannot be distinguished materially. For example in the 
Odyssey, Odysseus and Noman are numerically one 
because their material composition cannot be distinguished. 
Two things are formally one just in case their real 
definitions cannot be distinguished. For example, any two 
people are formally the same because the real definition for 
human beings applies to them both. Two things are 
generically one just in case they are both subsumed under 
one genus.9 For example, a cat and a mouse are generi­
cally one because they are both species of the genus 
"animal." Finally, two things are analogically one just in 
case one stands in relation to something as the other stands 
in relation to yet a fourth. Aristotle’s way of putting this 
at 1016b35 seems somewhat strange at first, but upon 
closer inspection his account accords with our usual 
understanding of analogy. Aristotle claims that two things 
are analogically the same if they stand in a relation to each 
other as a third thing does to a fourth. We typically think 
of analogy in terms of relational sameness. Thus, the 
relation between the soul and the body is analogous to the 
relation between a pilot and his ship; the soul and the 
captain are said to have analogous roles. Aristotle's 
formulation would have this relation expressed in something
’Aristotle claims that genera are one in a way similar 
to the way in which matter is one (Met., 1016a25).
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like the following way: The captain and the soul are
analogously the same because the captain is to the soul as 
the ship is to the body. While perhaps strange for us, the 
idea captured is identical.10
Again reworking the premises, we get:
A ") All essences of sensible substance are incomposite.
l0If we wish to think of the sameness relation or the 
oneness relation as a two-place relation asserting the 
identity (understood the way we typically understand it) of 
its relata, then we can understand Aristotle's distinctions 
among the four senses of sameness and oneness in the 
following way: (1) If two things are asserted to be 
numerically the same or numerically one, then this is 
equivalent to saying that the matter of the former is 
identical with the matter of the latter; (2) If two things are 
asserted to be formally the same, then this is equivalent to 
saying that the essence of the former is identical with the 
essence of the latter ; and like transformations apply for the 
generic and analogical species of sameness and oneness. 
Note that in going from the Aristotelian formulation to the 
formulation in terms of identity, the relata may change. 
For example, it makes perfect sense for Aristotle to claim 
that Socrates is formally the same as Callias, but it would 
be incorrect to claim that Socrates is identical with Callias. 
Rather if the relation of formal sameness obtains between 
Socrates and Callias, then the essence of Socrates is 
identical with the essence of Callias. The relata in the case 
of the formal sameness relation are Socrates and Callias, 
but in the case of the identity relation, the relata are their 
respective essences.
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B” ) All definitions are composed of the term referring 
to an ultimate differentia and the term referring to a 
primary genus.
C ") All definitions have the same structure as the 
essences of which they are definitions.
These four premises still apparently entail the conclusion 
that there can be no definitions of substance, but on the 
basis of this last reconstruction Aristotle's problem now can 
be stated clearly. All definitions are composite, while all 
essences are incomposite. The structures of definitions 
must be the same as the structures of those things of which 
they are formulae, viz. essences. So, either Aristotle can 
explain how a formula which is composite can have the 
same structure as an essence which is incomposite, or he 
must reject one of his assumptions. I will now argue that 
Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds o f definitions, of 
which one has a structure which is analogously the same as 
the structure of the essence to which it refers.
It was stated that definitions are formulae composed of 
the ultimate differentia and the primary genus. In what 
sense of "composite" (σ ύνθετα ) are definitions separable 
into parts for Aristotle? One possible alternative is that 
definitions are divisible into independently existing, 
meaningful conceptual parts, viz., the ultimate differentia 
and the primary genus. This would be to attribute the 
aggregate view of the part-whole relation to the structure of 
definitions, and this is the sense in which Aristotle believes 
that the Platonists conceive of their definitions; for on 
Aristotle's reading of the Platonist position, every 
meaningful concept involved in a Platonic division is 
independently meaningful and can stand alone as a concept 
in virtue of its referring to a corresponding substance, viz.,
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its Form (see Zeta 15). For example, the concept of 
animal was meaningful because it referred to the Form of 
animalness. The Platonist had posited these independently 
existing substances, at least in part, to secure a fixed 
meaning for our language and concepts. Each term in the 
Platonist definition would be meaningful in virtue of some 
corresponding substantial Form which is its semantic 
ground. Thus on the Platonist account, it would be 
possible for the primary genus, animal, to be a meaningful 
concept even if all concrete particular instances of animals 
went our of existence; for, it refers to its own universal 
substance, viz., the Form of animalness. Like considera­
tions apply to all other meaningful concepts for the Plato­
nist. Aristotle's arguments from Zeta 13 through Zeta 16 
can be understood, in part, as attempts to refute this 
Platonic conception of the parts of definitions by under­
mining the claim that any universal is a substance in the 
way that Aristotle understands the Platonic Forms to be 
substances; having shown by means of these arguments that 
no such universal substances can exist, Aristotle believes he 
has effectively removed the semantic ground for the Pla­
tonic conception of language and concepts.
Having argued against the Platonist’s conception 
definition, Aristotle turns to his alternative conception, a 
project which takes him beyond book Zeta into Books Eta, 
Theta, and Iota. ■
Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to 
deal with certain metaphysical problems concerning changes 
of sensible substances. In working out the epistemological 
presuppositions of his theory of sensible substance in the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle was forced to incorporate his 
distinction between matter and essence into his theory o f 
definition as proposed in the Posterior Analytics.
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In Zeta 11, Aristotle had rejected the claim that terms 
referring to the material parts of sensible substances were 
to be included in the formula of the essence; he also 
rejected the claim that there was a formula of the matter. 
The material parts were not included because they were not 
a part of the essence of the sensible substance, and the 
definition was of the essence; and there could be no 
definition of the matter, since matter was indeterminate. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle recognizes in Zeta 11 that to 
expunge reference to the matter of sensible substances from 
definitions of sensible substances would be a mistake, since 
the material nature of sensible substance is one of its 
essential characteristics.
Hence to reduce everything in this way and to 
dispose of the matter is going too far . . . For the 
animal is sensible and cannot be defined without 
motion, and hence not unless its parts are in some 
definite condition; for it is not a hand in any 
condition that is a part of a man, but only when it 
can perform its function. (Mel., 1036b22-23,28-31; 
trans. Tredennick)
Aristotle puts off his investigation into how the material 
aspect o f sensible substance is to be accommodated in the 
definition until Zeta 12 where he takes up the question in 
connection with the method of division.
According to Aristotle, either the primary genus 
absolutely does not exist as a meaningful concept 
independently of its ultimate differentiae or the primary 
genus exists is a meaningful concept only insofar as it 
refers to the proximate matter.
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If then, the genus absolutely does not exist apart 
from the species which it includes, or if it exists, 
but only as matter (for speech is genus and matter, 
and the differentia make the species, i.e., the 
letters, out of it), obviously the definition is the 
formula composed of the differentiae. (Met., 
1038a6; trans. Tredennick)
In the first case, Aristotle alludes to his doctrine in the 
Categories (2b5ff.) according to which all genera are 
ontologically dependent upon their infitna species, which in 
turn are ontologically dependent upon the particulars which 
they subsume. On this reading, the term referring to the 
primary genus would fail to refer if all of its subordinate 
species ceased to exist. For example, "anim ar would fail 
to refer if all of the various species of animals went out of 
existence. In the second case, Aristotle suggests the 
doctrine presented in Book Eta chapter 6 where he 
identifies the primary genus with the proximate matter and 
the ultimate differentia with the form. The crucial passage 
comes at Met. 1045al5:
What is it, then, that makes "man" one thing, and 
why does it make him one thing and not many, e.g. 
"animar and "two-footed," especially if, as some 
say, there is an Idea of "animal" and an Idea of 
"two-footed"? . . . But if, as we maintain, man is 
part matter and part form—the matter being 
potentially, and the form actually man—, the point 
we are investigating will no longer seem to be a . 
difficulty. For this difficulty is just the same as we 
should have if the definition of X were "round 
bronze"; for this name would give a clue to the 
formula; . . . The difficulty is no longer apparent,
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because the one is matter and the other form, (trans.
Tredennick)
Aristotle is here talking about the definition of "man" as 
"two-footed animal" and claims that the parts of the 
definition "two-footed" and "animal" are essential parts of 
the definition, one of which refers to the formal aspect of 
the essence of the sensible substance man and the other to 
the material aspect. As he goes on to claim, with regard to 
the definitions of sensible substance, "part of the formula 
is always matter and part actuality" (Met., 1045a35). It is 
crucial to note here that Aristotle claims that both essences 
of sensible substance and definitions of sensible substances 
involve a part which is material, i.e., potentiality, and part 
which is actuality; the case of man is intended as an 
instance of this general claim. This has important 
ramifications for our reconstruction of the problem in Zeta 
13, for now it becomes clear that premise A ” needs to be 
reevaluated.
Premise A " asserts that all essences of sensible 
substances are incomposite (ά σύνθετα). It now appears that 
the essences of sensible substances are composite in that 
they involve parts one of which is actuality and one of 
which is potentiality. Has Aristotle thus rescinded his 
claim made in Zeta 13? No. It is still the case that the 
essences are incomposite, if by incomposite we mean the 
aggregate conception of the part-whole relation. It is this 
Platonic sense of the composite nature of sensible 
substances which Aristotle denies in Zeta 13, and it is 
against this conception of the composite nature o f sensible 
substances that the arguments in Zeta 14-16 are directed. 
Once the parts of the sensible substance are explained in 
terms of actuality and potentiality, Aristotle can adopt a 
revised premise A” ', which can be expressed as follows:
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A '" )  All essences of sensible substances are composed 
of a part which is potentiality and a part which is 
actuality.
Aristotle incorporates the material aspect of the essence 
of sensible substances into the definitions of sensible 
substances by identifying it with the primary genus of the 
sensible substance. If the primary genus refers to the 
proximate matter, then Aristotle is committed to the claim 
that the primary genus is potentially some substance (e.g.. 
De An. 412bl0ff.). For example, if the proximate matter 
of a human being, viz., flesh and bones, lacks the essence 
of human being, viz., soul, then that proximate matter does 
not possess any definite nature, any life (Met., 1036b32). 
The primary genus "animal" refers to the proximate matter 
which is potentially a human being; the matter is, in this 
instance, only homonymously called "human." On the 
other hand, if the proximate matter of a human being is 
informed by a soul, then the primary genus "animal" again 
refers to the proximate matter; but in this case, in virtue of 
the essence which informs the proximate matter and which 
makes it actually a human being, thè genus is a part of the 
definition of the essence of that human being.
Conversely, with regard to sensible substances and as 
was noted above, the essence cannot exist separately from 
the proximate matter. Unless the requisite matter is 
present, there can be no instantiation of the actuality of 
man. Aristotle discusses this reciprocal dependence of 
proximate matter and essence in terms of potentiality and 
actuality. The essences of sensible substances are the 
actualities of sensible substances, while the proximate 
materials of sensible substances are the potentialities of 
sensible substances. This is, in part, the import of 
Aristotle's investigations in Book Theta into actuality and
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potentiality for his doctrine of sensible substance and his 
theory of definition.
These considerations lead to the following revised 
premise B " ’:
B '" )  All definitions are composed of a term referring 
to the actuality of the sensible substance (viz., ultimate 
differentia) and a term referring to the proximate matter 
of the sensible substance (viz., the primary genus).
We must still determine how the parts of the definition so 
construed enable Aristotle to claim that the structure of a 
definition is the same as the structure of the essence of the 
sensible substance to which it refers. But putting the 
various premises together, the prospect for resolving the 
problem now appears, for the second time, good:
A ’ " )  All essences of sensible substances are composed 
of a part which is potentiality and a part which is 
actuality.
B '" )  All definitions are composed of a term referring 
to the actuality of the sensible substance (viz., ultimate 
differentia) and a term referring to the potentiality of 
the sensible substance (viz., the primary genus).
C ” ) All definitions have the same structure as the 
essences of which they are definitions.
At 1043b29, Aristotle claims that there can be definition 
only of substances which essentially involve a combination 
of actuality and potentiality, viz., sensible substances or 
intelligible substances, and he argues against the claim that 
there can be definitions of substances which are either pure
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actuality or pure potentiality. He argues for these 
conclusions on the basis of premise C " ,  claiming that the 
defining formula denotes something predicated of 
something, and this must be partly of the nature of matter 
and partly of the nature of form. Immediately following 
this discussion, he compares the unity (εν) of numbers with 
the unity (ε v) of definitions. Numbers, Aristotle claims, are 
substances in the same way that sensible substances are 
substances, i.e ., the account of their unity essentially 
involves both actuality and potentiality.
Just as when any element which composes the number 
is subtracted or added, it is no longer the same number 
but a different one, however small the subtraction or 
addition is; so neither the definition nor the essence will 
continue to exist if something is subtracted from or 
added to it. And a number must be something in virtue 
of which it is a unity...And the definition is a 
unity.. .each substance is a kind of actuality and nature. 
(Met., 1043b36-1044a3, 5-6, 9; trans. Tredennick)
Just as some of Aristotle's contemporaries had argued that 
the unity o f a definition could be explained in terms of 
aggregation, so also had some argued that the unity o f 
number was explainable in terms of aggregation (cf.· Met., 
1041M0 and Plato's Theatetus 202Aff.). . Since the 
definition of sensible substance involves parts, one might 
argue that the unity of the definition consists in the 
aggregation of the parts, and it is this suggestion that 
Aristotle wishes to confute, recognizing that this conception 
of definition allows for such things as the Iliad to count as 
a definition. The success of Aristotle’s refutation of the 
aggregate conception of the unity of definition turns on his 
account of the unity of an actuality or kind of nature.
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In marshaling his argument against the claim that the 
unity of definition is to be understood in terms of aggregate 
conception of the part-whole relation, Aristotle claims that 
there is a sense of unity (εν) which explains the unity of 
numbers, definitions, and essences. Aristotle had presented 
his analysis of the concept of unity in Book Delta (see . 
above), but he returns to this analysis in Book Iota, and it 
is there that we find Aristotle's explanation of the unity of 
sensible substance, definition, and number in terms of the 
essential conception of the part-whole relation. Aristotle 
distinguishes between two similar questions "What sort of 
things are called one (εν)?" and "What is essential unity (τ 6 
έ ν ι  ε ίν α ι) ,  and what is the formula?" The former 
question he takes himself to have answered in Book Delta. 
The latter question (the question of the moment) differs 
from the first question, according to Aristotle, in that the 
first concerns how the term (όνομα) "one" is used while the 
second question concerns the denotation (δ ύ να μ ις )  of the 
term. Aristotle answers the second question as follows:
To be one (το  έ ν ι  ε ίν α ι)  is to be indivisible (το  
ά δ ια ιρ έ τ ω  έ σ τ ίν )  (being essentially a particular thing, 
distinct and separate in place or form or thought), or to 
be whole and indivisible; but especially to be the first 
measure of each kind (τδ μ έτρ φ  ε ίν α ι πρώ τω  έκαστου 
γένους κα ί κ υ ρ ιώ τα τα  τοΰ ποσού). (Met., 1052Μ6-19, 
loosely following Tredennick)
The nature of unity must be the same for all categories. 
(Met., 1053b24, trans. Tredennick)
From these passages we can derive a number of germane 
conclusions. All essences are unities because they are the 
indivisible units of their respective kinds, distinctive in
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form. Likewise, all definitions are unities because they are 
the indivisible units, the Ínfima species composed of the 
ultimate differentia and die primary genus, of their 
respective conceptual hierarchies (see Zeta 12 for 
Aristotle's claims on this point). Essences are indivisible 
in the sense that they consist of parts which are not 
themselves individual things (one is pure actuality and the 
other pure potentiality), but they are divisible into parts 
corresponding to the actuality and the potentiality of the 
sensible substance. Likewise, definitions are not divisible 
into parts which themselves refer to individual things (one 
refers to the actuality and the other to the potentiality of 
some essence, neither of which is an individual thing), but 
they are divisible into parts corresponding to the concepts 
referring to the actuality and the potentiality.
Thus we come to the resolution o f the problem raised 
at the end of Zeta 13. The structure of a definition of 
substance is analogously the same as the structure of an 
essence of sensible substance because the definition is to the 
de se category of substance what the essence of sensible 
substance is to the de re category of substance. Or, to put 
it in a more Aristotelian formulation, a definition of 
sensible substance is analogously the same as an essence of 
sensible substance because they are related in the same way 
that the de se category of substance is related to the de re 
category of substance.
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